Ref: 10/2008
Date: 18 March 2008
PCHR Publishes a New Report Evaluating the Performance of the Palestinian Legislative Council
On Tuesday, 18 March 2008, PCHR has published a report titled “The Palestinian Legislative Council: Performance Evaluation.” This new report is the 9th in a series of reports published by PCHR evaluating the performance of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) since its establishment in 1996. It focuses on evaluating the PLC’s performance during its first parliamentary round, from 7 March 2006 to 7 July 2007. The term was extended for 4 additional months according to a decree issued by the President of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA).
This report part of PCHR’s ongoing work to monitor the PLC’s performance to explore its failures and to urge it to carry out its duties of legislation, accountability and monitoring over the Executive. This work also seeks to support efforts to promote institutionalism and separation of powers in the PNA.
According to the new report, the first parliamentary terms has been the worst since the inception of the PLC in 1996 with regard to legislation, accountability and monitoring, which can be attributed to a number of political factors that affected the PLC’s performance.
Three main factors have impacted the performance of the PLC. First, Israeli Occupation Forces (IOF) escalated attacks against the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) following the Palestinian legislative election, in which Hamas won the majority of the PLC’s seats. IOF further escalated such attacks following an armed attack by the Palestinian resistance against an IOF military post to the southeast of Rafah in June 2006, in which 2 IOF soldiers were killed and a third one was captured. IOF also arrested dozens of PLC members affiliated to Hamas, including the Speaker and the Secretary.
The second factor was the financial boycott against the PNA. Israel abstained from transferring tax revenues it collates on behalf of the PNA in accordance with the Palestinian-Israeli Interim Agreement and tightened the siege imposed on the OPT. On the other hand, the United States, the European Union, Japan and Canada decided a suspension of financial aid to the PNA.
The third factor was the deterioration in internal security conditions. The internal security situation deteriorated and the state of lawlessness escalated, especially in the Gaza Strip, which particularly witnessed bloody fighting between Fatah and Hamas movements, which took the lives of dozens of members of the two movements and dozens of civilians.
There were hopes that the Mecca Agreement signed between Fatah and Hamas movements in February 2007 would lead to national reconciliation, which would restore the prestige of the legislature. A national coalition government was formed. It gained the confidence of the PLC on 17 March 2007.
However, an atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion continued to prevail between the two movements. The two movements exchanged accusations, which was an indicator that confrontation was imminent. In fact, a new round of fighting ensued between the two movements in May and it was much fiercer than previous ones.
Another round of fighting between the two movements erupted in the first week of June 2007. This round of fighting ended with Hamas’ takeover of the Gaza Strip. In light of such serious developments, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas issued decrees dissolving the national coalition government; declaring a state of emergency throughout the OPT; and establishing an emergency enforcement government. President Abbas issued another decree suspending article 65, 66 and 67 of the Basic Law (the temporary constitution of the PNA).
These measures negatively impacted and completely paralyzed the PLC. Subsequent periods witnessed political maneuvers between the two movements, which further contributed to paralyzing the PLC. In July 2007, Hamas called for a session of the PLC to open an exceptional term, but PLC members from Fatah movement boycotted the session considering it illegal. The PLC entered another crisis related to authorizations obtained by PLC members affiliated to Hamas in the Gaza Strip from their colleagues who have been detained by IOF. The other parliamentary blocs considered these authorizations as illegal, and lacking support from the Basic Law or PLC bylaws. Hamas considered the authorizations legal and held a number of sessions, which were boycotted by other parliamentary blocs. PCHR believed that those sessions were legally irrelevant and were part of the outstanding political crisis.
The report concludes that the PLC’s crisis is a political one, and there is no way to overcome it without serious dialogue. The alternative to dialogue is more division and separation in the Palestinian political system.
